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[L. A. No. 22217.

In Bank.

[40 C.2d

May 5, 1953.]

In re LOS ANGELES COUNTY PIONEER SOCIE'l'Y, a
Corporation, in Process of Voluntary Dissolution. LOS
ANGELES COUNTY PIONEER SOCIETY et al., Appellants, v. HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA (a Corporation) et al., Respondents;
'l'HE PEOPLE et al., Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata-Persons Concluded.-A declaratory
judgment is res judicata only against persons who were par-

ties or in privity with parties thereto.
[2] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Finality.--The label of a judgment as "interlocutory" is not determinative on the question of
whether it is appealable, since it is the substance and effect
of a judgment that determines its finality.
[3] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Ordinarily an appeal
lies only from a final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.)
[4] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Where no issue is left
for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the first decree, that decree is final, but where
anything further in the nature of judicial action on part of
court is essential to a final determination of rights of parties,
the decree is interlocutory.
[5] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality.-Where judgment provides that corporation should account to court for performance
of its duties as trustee, that new trustee should be appointed
to replace the corporation, and that court would from time
to time "make such other and further orders as are competent,
lawful and proper for a complete determination of this action,"
such judgment, in view of this reservation of questions for
future decision, is not final as to such corporation and hence
is not appealable by it.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 215; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 219
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 22 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 415; [2] Appeal and
Error, § 29; [3] Appeal and Error, § 26; [4, 5] Appeal and Error,
§31; [6] Charities, §18; [7] Charities, §34; [8] Charities, §25;
[9, 10] Charities, § 40; [11] Charities, § 36; [12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 23]
Charities, § 30; [14] Charities, § 32; [15, 22] Charities, § 35; [16]
Charities, §39; [19] Courts, §§103, 104; [21] Charities, §4; [24]
Charities, § 29.
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[6] Charities- Historical Commemoration and Research.- The
commemoration of historical events and the collection and
preservation of data of historical interest are for the educational and recreational benefit of the community as a whole
and are recognized charitable purposes.
[7] !d.-Charitable Corporations.-Since members of a charitable
organization often participate in its activities with the object
of making new friends and participating in pleasurable group
activities in the course of carrying out the charitable purposes of the organization, the incidental social activities of
a corporation organized for the purpose of collection and
preservation of data touching the early history of the state
do not deprive such corporation of its charitable character.
[8] Id.-Beneficiaries.-A gift or devise to a society organized for
a charitable purpose without a declaration of the use to which
the gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the objects
for which the organization was created.
[9] Id.-Actions-Parties.-The attorney general is a necessary
party to proceedings affecting the disposition of assets of a
charitable trust.
[10] Id.-Actions-Parties.-Since Corp. Code, § 10207, expressly
makes it the duty of the attorney general to protect assets
held by a charitable corporation, it is proper to allow him
to intervene in dissolution proceedings of such a corporation
and to challenge its claim that the assets could be distributed
for the personal benefit of its members.
[11] !d.-Administration and ControL-Under Corp. Code, §§ 9505,
10207, a charitable corporation is subject to the same supervision by the attorney general as is a nonprofit corporation
holding its assets subject to a charitable trust, and deviations
from the purposes stated in the corporation's articles are thus
subject to the same corrective measures that would be taken
against a trustee of a charitable trust that similarly refused
to carry out its duties.
[12] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.-Conduct of charitable corporation, organized for purpose of collection and preservation of data touching early history of
state, in amending its bylaws to close its membership and
provide that existing members have a proprietary interest in
its assets, in bringing a declaratory relief action to obtain a
ruling that the assets are not held in trust, paying attorneys'
fees for both parties, in selling its assets, in commencing dis-

[6] Validity, as for a charitable purpose, of trust for dissemination or preservation of material of historical or other educational
interest or value, note, 12 A.L.R.2d 849. See, also, Cal.Jur., Charities, ? 15; Am.Jur., Charities, § 63 et seq.
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solution proceedings, etc., demonstrates that it has abused and
abandoned its trust and sustains determination of trial court
that a new trustee should be appointed.
[13] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust.-If the trustees of a
charitable trust abandon or abuse their trust, equity will
correct the abuses and remove the offenders.
[14] !d.-Corporations as Donees.-Members of an incorporated
society organized for charitable purposes cannot appropriate
to themselves the assets previously acquired by the device of
renouncing the purposes expressed in its articles.
[15] Id.- Dissolution of Charitable Corporation.- A charitable
corporation cannot dissolve and distribute its assets among
its members.
[16] Id.-Actions-Issues.-Attorney general intervening in dissolution proceedings of a charitable corporation is not required
to give such corporation an opportunity to comply with its
articles of incorporation prior to filing the petition in intervention, which alleged that the corporation failed to comply
with its articles, where the corporation failed to put the question in issue by stipulating that such petition could be filed
and filing an answer denying that its assets were held for
charitable purposes.
[17] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.-Attorney general's power under Corp. Code, § 10207, to obtain
appointment of a successor trustee where charitable corporation has abandoned trust by institution of dissolution proceedings is not limited to cases in which assets of such corporation have been distributed, and hence a termination of
the dissolution proceeding by the corporation would not preclude the attorney general from exercising this power.
[18] Id.- Trustees- Abandonment of Trust- New Trustee.Where property is conveyed to a trustee with an express
declaration of a charitable purpose by the donor, on failure
of the original trustee a court of equity will appoint a successor trustee to carry out the charitable purpose expressed
by the donor.
[19] Courts-Decisions as Precedents-Power to Overrule Decisions.-Judicial decisions may be overruled and dicta disapproved without violating either the due process clause or the
contract clause of the United States Constitution.
[20] Charities-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-New Trustee.A court of equity should appoint a successor trustee to carry
out the charitable intent of a donor whether the charitable
purpose is found in the terms of the conveyance to a corporation or in the latter's articles, or whether the failure of the
corporation is through dissolution or other disqualification.
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[21] Id.-.;,Attitude of Court.-The policy of law in favo:r of charitable gifts requires a court to earryout the dominant purpose
of the donor to make a charita,ble gift for the purposes expressed in the articles of the original corporate donee.
[22] Id.- Dissolution of Charitable Corporation- Reversion of
Property to Donors.~Property donated to a corporation .for
charitable purposes will not revert to the don'Ors 'Or their
heirs on dissolution of the corporation, since if the donors had
desired a reversion in such contingency they could have inserted clauses to that effect in their gifts, and since, in ease
the dissolution should occur many years after the det.tth of
the donors, it would be extremely difficult or impossible to
determine the heirs entitled to the property. (Disapproving
dictum to contrary in People v. President and Trustees of. College of California, 3B Cal. 166, 174.)
[23] !d.-Trustees-Abandonment of Trust-:-New 'l'rustee.-A historical society is qualified to act as successor trustee of the
assets of a charitable corporation which failed to comply
with purpose of organization to·. .collect and .preserve data
touching early history of state, where such society is also a
charitable corporation and is. actively engaged in collecting
and preserving material of historic interest in southern part
of state.
[24] Id.-Trustees-De:iiniteness of Powers.-.An order of court
appointing a historical society as successor trustee of a charita,ble
corporation which fails to. comply with purposes of trust properly limits the duties of such society. to the provisions of the
articles of the charitable corporation that it is organized for
the purpose of. coilecting and preserving data to,uching early
history of state, where sueh limitation conforms to the wishes
of the donors of the assets.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of .LO!! .Angeles .County appointing trustee of a charitable corporation.
James H. Pope, Judge pro tem;* Affirmed.
Morris Lavine for Appellant Los Angeles Copnty Pioneer
Society.
Roy Howard for Appellant Lelande.
Lawler, Felix & Hall and Oscar Lawler for Respondents.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney G(lneral, and Edward Sumner, Deputy Attorney General, for Interveners .. and Respondents.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Connell.
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TRAYNOR, J.--·Los Angeles County Pioneer Society and
Harry Lelande, a member thereof, appeal separately from
an order appointing the Historical Society of Southern California trustee of all property in the possession of Pioneer.
The order was entered after the trial court determined that
Pioneer held its property for charitable purposes, that Pioneer
had repudiated its trust, and that appointment of Historical
as trustee. was necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust.
We have concluded that the order is amply supported by
the evidence and must be affirmed.
Pioneer was founded in 1897 as an unincorporated association of pioneers living in Los Angeles County, with about
600 members. In 1910 the members incorporated as a nonprofit corporation. Over the years membership decreased
until in 1941 there were less than 100 members. In that year
and later years Mrs. Emma Stoltenberg, a member of Pioneer,
made substantial g·ifts to Pioneer and on her death in 1946
left additional sums to Pioneer by will. Her gifts amounted
to about $53,000. The money was used to purchase a building
that was used for meetings of Pioneer and rented for commercial purposes. The membership continued to decrease and
in 1948 the members decided to dissolve the corporation, distribute the assets among themselves, and continue the organization as an unincorporated association to carry out the purpose~ Q:Lthe articles of incorporation.
. .••...
. To determine whether its assets were impressed with'1t'\
trust, Pioneer filed an action for declaratory relief against.-/
a me1nber of the society; On June 1; I949;3udgmen"fwas-en:
~ereddeclariii!ft11arno trust of any kind was impressed upon
the assets. Thereafter the membership, by a petition signed
by 53 of the 58 members, agreed to dissolve the corporation.
The assets were converted to cash and, since the property
owned by the corporation had greatly appreciated in value,
$95,243.54 was realized. Pioneer then petitioned the superior
court for judicial supervision of the dissolution. (Corp. Code,
§ 4607.) Several members of Pioneer objected to the dissolution. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the attorney
general filed a petition in intervention, alleging that Pioneer
held its assets in trust and praying that a new trustee be appointed on the ground that Pioneer had abandoned its trust.
The court ordered that the assets be impounded. On Ma;y 19,
J950""\he court entered judgment that Pioneer was a charitaJ)Te···~
/corporation, that its assets were dedicated to charitable pur- /
1
'.Jl.~ses, that it bad abandoned its trust and was threa~~~1l~.tl~../
<

'"

~~";;""A~'

p
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to divert the assets to the private benefit of its members, and;
·. that appointment of a new trustee was necessary. The judg',ment was entitled "interlocutory judgment" and the court
retained jurisdiction to make such further orders as were
necessary to a complete determination of the action. Pioneer
did not appeal. On October 18, 1950, after a further hearing,
the court appointed Historical trustee and ordered the impounded assets turned over to it. The present appeals are
from this order.
The first question presented is whether the trial court correctly determined that all of the assets of Pioneer were given
and received for charitable purposes and held by Pioneer
for those purposes.
Pioneer contends that the declaratory relief judgment is
res judicata as to the question whether Pioneer holds its assets
for charitable purposes, and characterizes the opposition to
the dissolution proceedings as a collateral attack on the former
adjudication, relying upon City of San Diego v. Snperior
Court, 36 Cal.2d 483 [224 P.2d 685]. Historical, on the other
hand, contends that the declaratory relief action was collusive
and a fraud on the court, pointing out that all evidence
therein was presented by stipulation, that Pioneer paid the
attorneys' fees for both plaintiff and defendant in that action,
and that the two opposing attorneys subsequently joined
forces and together represented Pioneer at the trial of the
dissolution proceedings. (See Guardianship of Jacobson, 30
Cal.2d 326, 333 [182 P.2d 545] .) [1] It is unnecessary to
pass upon Historical's contention, since the declaratory relief
judgment is res judicata only against persons who were
parties or in privity with parties thereto. (Rest. Judgments, § 77; Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807,
813 [122 P.2d 892] ; City & County of Denver v. Denver Land
Co., 85 Colo. 198, 201 [274 P. 743].) The attorney general
was not a party to the declaratory relief action and was not
in privity with parties thereto and, accordingly, he was not
bound by that adjudication and was free to contend in the
dissolution proceedings that Pioneer held its assets for charitable purposes.
'fhe attorney general and Historical contend that the "interlocutory judgment'' entered on 1\l[ay 19th was an appealable
judgment that became final through the failure of Pioneer to
appeal therefrom, and that it is now res judicata that Pioneer
holds its assets for charitable purposes. [2] The label of
the judgment as "interlocutory" is not determinative upon
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this question, since it is the substance and effect of a judgment that determines its finality. (Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal.2d
659, 669-670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Peninsula Prop. Co. v. County
of Santa Cruz, 106 Cal.App.2d 669, 678 [235 P.2d 635].)
[3] An appeal lies only from a final judgment, except in
certain cases not applicable here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963.)
[ 4] "As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said
that where no issue is left for future consideration except
the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of
the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything
further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the
court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the
parties, the decree is interlocutory." (Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19
Cal.2d 659, 670.) [5] In the present case the May 19th
judgment provided that Pioneer should account to the court
for the performance of its duties as trustee, that a new trustee
should be appointed to replace Pioneer, and that the court
would from time to time ''make such other and further orders
as are competent, lawful and proper for a complete determination of this action.'' The assets of Pioneer were impounded by the court on February 15, 1950, but it was not
ordered that they be turned over to Historical until the order
of October 18th. Since the court expressly reserved for
future decision questions regarding the rights, duties, and
liabilities of Pioneer, the May 19th judgment was not final
as to Pioneer and was not appealable. (Erickson v. Boothe,
35 Cal.2d 108, 109 [216 P.2d 454] ; Lacey v. Bertone, 33 Cal.
2d 649, 653 [203 P.2d 755] ; Lyon v. Goss, supra, 19 Cal.2d
659, 671; see cases collected in 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error,
pp. 184-193.) The conclusion that Pioneer could not appeal
from the judgment of May 19th disposes of the contention
of appellant Lelande that the appeal by Pioneer must be
dismissed because it was taken too late.
Since neither the declaratory relief judgment nor the
May 19th judgment settled the issue whether :Pton~~r~hel!i
its assets for charitable pu~pos"es,Jthe determinative question::\
whether substantial evidence supports the order of October ' \
18th. The__a1:ticles ofjncorporation
Pioneer provide: \
"That the purpose for which this corporation is formed is to ')
cultivate social intercoul'se and friendship among its members,
to collect and preserve data touching the early history of }
Los Angeles County and the State of California, to collect and J
preserve articles, specimens and material things illustratiy~
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eu~tomc:, modes and habits of the
times in snid State; to perpet.natr the memory of
those who, by their labors and heroism, eontributed to make
the history of said County and State; and in furtherance of
said purpose [to do all acts] necessary and convenient for
the promotion of the aforesaid purpose ; and to exist as a
social corporation under the provisions of the laws of the
State of California, covering such corporations, and not for
pecuniary profit.'' In Pioneer's answer to the petition in
intervention it is alleged that between 1945 and 1950 Pioneer
engaged in acquiring material concerning the pioneers and
founders of r~os Angeles County and the State of California;
that Pioneer perpetuated the memory of those who by their
labors and heroism contributed to make the history of the
county and the state; that the members attended a meeting
at the Biltmore Hotel in 1948 to honor the memory of the
dead pioneers during the discovery of gold in California;
that Pioneer participated in the erection of a plaque at Inglewood, California, to mark the site of the first school building
in Inglewood; that Pioneer held four picnics at which time
the memory of the former pioneers and founders of Los
Angeles County were commemorated; that in 1947 Pioneer
celebrated the 166th anniversary of the founding of the city
of Los Angeles and the members dressed in costumes of the
Spanish period; that at the monthly meetings talks and disctlssions were held recollecting the activities and labors of
the pioneers and their memories were perpetuated and
honored; and that many further and additional activities
were engaged in pursuant to the purposes set forth in the
articles of incorporation.
[6] The commemoration of historical events and the collection and preservation of data of historical interest are for
the educational and recreational benefit of the community as
a whole and are recognized charitable purposes. (Rest.,
'rrusts, § 374; Estate of Entin, 81 Cal.App.2d 76, 81 [183
P.2d 304j; In re Centenn£al & Memorial Assn. of Valley Forge,
235 Pa. 206, 211 r83 A. 683] ; Steenis v. Appleton, 230
Wis. 530, 533 [284 N.W. 492] ; JJiissour-i Historical Society v.
Academy of Sdence, 94 Mo. 459, 466 [8 S.W. 346]; 12 A.L.R.
2d 888-896.) By the allegations in its answer, Pioneer conceded
that it was actively engaged in carrying· out such objectives.
Even if the concessions in the answer are disregarded,
the articles of incorporation supply sufficient evidence to sustaiu tbe action of tl1e trial conrL It may be assumed that if

nr dewoHstratiYe of tit<'
afon~;;;aid
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thA only purpose of PionAer were "to cultivate social inter(~ourse and friendship among its members" it would not be a
!~haritable eorporation (Ree 2 Bogert, Trusts and.J':t:l,!Stees,
j_3§0, and ease;; cited.. thereil1.2., but it is clear from a reading ~.
/of the articles as a whole that the social purposes of Pioneer.
l..~.are.incidental to its public and charitable purposes. [7J si~~~
members of a charitable organization often participate in its
activities with the object of making new friends and participating in pleasurable group activities in the course of
carrying out the charitable purposes of the organization, the
incidental social activities of Pioneer do not deprive it of its
charitable character. (See Yo7tng v. Boy Scouts of America,
9 Cal.App.2d 760, 764 [51 P.2d 191] ; Estate of Wirt, 124
Cal.App. 7, 11 [12 P.2d 95] .) The same conclusion was reached
in Estate of Dol, 186 Cal. 64, 65 [198 P. 1039], where this
court held that a gift to Pioneer was invalid under the mortmain statute ( Civ. Code, § 1313, now Prob. Code, § 41) on
the ground that Pioneer was a charitable corporation. It is
not necessary to determine here whether the Dol decision is
res judicata as to the issue whether Pioneer is a charitable
corporation, as urged by the attorney general, since the action
of the trial court in the present case may be sustained by
g·iving the Dol decision the effect of stare decisis only.
Pioneer contends that the gifts of Mrs. Stoltenberg were
for the benefit of the members of Pioneer personally and
were not received for charitable purposes. Her will provided:
''the Balance of my estate to be given to the Pioneer Society
Meeting at the Biltmore Hotel.'' The gifts during her lifetime were subject to an oral understanding that the money
would be used to purchase a permanent home for the society.
Pioneer erroneously assumes that the gift could not be for
charitable purposes..-unlesLthe . instr:gm~11t g:f~if.L~~m:~ly
so provided. [8]/" [A] devise
a society organized for~
--~-,,, ""¥
\
/·clraritaotE\··purpose without a declaration of the use to which )
// the gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the obj~
\
for wbiclt ..th.tl organization was created. •;c(Esfate oTTflip···~, 75 Cal.A'pp:2etzf:2tr,~.{l~l·F:~d 567]; Estate of
McDole, 215 Cal. 328, 332 [10 P.2d 75] .) Similarly, in
the present case the gift of Mrs. Stoltenberg in her will was
for the purposes expressed in Pioneer's articles, and the
gifts during her lifetime were for a building to be used to
carry out those purposes.
The conclusion that Pioneer held its assets for charitable
purposes disposes of Pioneer's contention that the trial court

to
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Rhould not have allowed the attorney general to become a
party to the dissolution proceedings. [9, 10] The attorney
general is a necessary party to proceedings affecting the
disposition of assets of a charitable trust (People v. CogsweU,
113 Cal. 129, 136 [45 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 269); Society of Calif.
Pioneers v. McElt·oy, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 342 [146 P.2d 962] ;
Rest., Trusts, § 391; cases collected in 14 C.J.S. Charities, § 62b), and when assets are held by a charitable
eorporation, as here, the duty to protect such assets is expressly placed upon the attorney general by the Corporations Code. ( § 10207.) Accordingly, it was not error to allow
the attorney general to intervene in the dissolution proceedings and challenge the claim of Pioneer that the assets could
be distributed for the personal benefit of its members.
The next question to be determined is whether the trial
eourt was justified in appointing a successor trustee. Pioneer
eontends that the only remedy available to the attorney general was an order of the trial court directing Pioneer to
eomply with its articles. As previously pointed out, substantial evidence supports the finding of the trial court that
Pioneer held its assets for charitable purposes. [11] Under
the Corporations Code a charitable corporation is subject to
the same supervision by the attorney general as is a nonprofit
corporation holding its assets subject to a charitable trust
/~§~&e&;-10207;. see 2§._ §Q:Cal~"J:J.R~y, . 8j1)) and deviat1on1f",
' from the purposes stated in Pioneer's articles are thus subject ·
to the same corrective measures that would be taken against a
trustee of a charitable trust that similarly refused to carry
·~1t its duties.
·Pioneer aniimded its by-laws to close its membership and
provide that existing members had a proprietary interest in
its assets; 1 it brought a declaratory relief action to obtain
a rnling that the assets were not held in trust, paying the
Ht.tornr>~' fr>r>s for· both partiesthereto; it sold its assets and
rrilured its property to cash ; it commenced dissolution pro1
By-laws adopted May 4, 1948, provided: "The class of acUve memberships shall have exclusive proprietary rights to the property and assets
of the corporation and the voting power of the corporation shall be
vested exclusively in the holders of active memberships. Each active
member shall be entitled to one vote.
''The social memberships shall have no proprietary rig·hts whatsoever
in the property or assets of the corporation and shall not have any voting
rights. . . .
''The present paid up memberships of this corporation shall constitute
the active memberships of the corporation and those who hereafter be·
come members shall be social members only.''
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ceedings; and it maintained in the trial court, in a petition
for writs of prohibition and mandate, 2 and on this appeal
lha~)t~~ assets are not held for charitable purp~ses.
[12] Pioneer's course of conduct throughout these proceedings thus demonstrates that it has abused and abandoned its
trust and amply supports the determination of the. trial coup;/
\ . .lhl!t a new trustee should be appointed. (Corp. Code, §10207 ;
Estate of Grblny, 147 Neb. 117, 131 [22 N.W.2d 488]; Attor·ney General v. Ar·rnstrong, 231 Mass. 196, 214 [120 N.E.
678]; Rest., Trusts, §§ 387, 399.) [13] "If the trustees
abandon or in any way abuse their trust, equity will correct the abuses and remove the offenders." (People v.
Cogswell, supra, 113 Cal. 129, 141; see Scott on Trusts, § 387.)
Pioneer invokes cases where the evidence showed that the
corporation involved was a nonprofit corporation that existed
for the private benefit of the members thereof and that the
assets were not held for charitable purposes. In such cases
it is properly held that the assets are distributed among the
members upon dissolution (Corp. Code, § 9801; see Brown v.
La Societe Francaise DeB. JJiutuelle, 138 Cal. 475, 477 [71
P. 516] ; Abalian v. Townsend Social Center, Inc., 112 Cal.
App.2d 441, 449 [246 P.2d 965]; 168 A.L.R. 956), but those
decisions are not controlling here, since substantial evidence
supports the determination of the trial court that Pioneer
holds its assets for the charitable purposes expressed in its
articles of incorporation.
[14] Pioneer points out that in 1948 its by-laws were
amended to provide that active members ''shall have exclusive
proprietary rights in the property and assets of the corporation.'' Whatever may have been the prospective effect of this
amendment, it does not appear from the record that any
donations were received by Pioneer after the amendment' and""
.of·B4Ul:§e~+t"ne m~embers oCP1oneer could not appropriate to \
themselves the assets previously acquired by the device of/
·· rfpouncing the purposes expressed in its articles.
~/
Pioneer contends thafl:ipon··dissolution the u:s~rets""must
be distributed among its members and any holding allow2
The petition, 2 Civil 18328, was denied by the District Court of
Appeal without opinion on January 11, 1951, and a hearing was denied
by this comt on March 8, 1951. Pioneer contended that it "was
organized for the private interest and advantage of its members,'' that
''the fair and proper thing to do was to dissolve the corporation and
distribute the assets," and that "neither the public at large, nor the
community of Los Angeles'' had ''any interest in the affairs of petitioner.''
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ing the assets to he transferred t.o annthel' charitable corporation would he a eonfisrmtinn of the members' property
in contravention of the F'ourteenth Amendment. The contention is without merit, since the members of Pioneer have
not at any time bad any right to receive the property.
[15] A charitable eorporation eannot dissolve and distribute
its assets among its members. (See Ashton v. Dashaway Assn.,
84 Cal. 61, 69 [22 P. 660, 23 P. 1091, 7 L.R.A. 809]; Zollmann,
Ameriean Law of Charities, § 476.) Thus in a ease apposite
to the present ease, the Centennial and Memorial Assoeiation
of Valley Forge, a eharitable eorporation, received eontributions to perpetuate and preserve the site upon whieh George
Washington had eneamped in winter quarters. Upon dissolution, a member eontended that the funds should be distributed
among the members of the eorporation, but the eourt held that
no individual right to the funds existed and that the property should go to another eharitable eorporation with purposes akin to those of the dissolved eorporation. (In re Centennial & 111ernorial Assn. of Valley Forge, supra, 235 Pa. 206,
213; see In 1"e 111t. B'inai Hospital, 250 N.Y. 103, 113 (164 N.E.
871) .)
_[16],/Pioneer eontends that in proeeedings under seetion
J0207 a eharitable eorporation must be given an opportunity
to eorrect its deviation from its articles, as it would if the
proceeding were in quo warranto. ( § 4691.) Pioneer's ~on
tention eomes too late. The attorney general's petition in
intervention alleged that Pioneer had failed to comply with
its articles and prayed that the court distribute Pioneer's
assets to a trustee willing to comply .w~th the ch~:tritll,bk '
·purp()ses expressed in Pioneer's article~; 'Pioneer stipulated
that the petition of the attorney general could be filed and
filed an answer denying that its assets were held for charitable
purposes, alleging that it had at all times complied with its
artieles, and praying that its assets "be distributed pro rata
among the members of the Los Angeles County Pioneer
Society.'' By the stipulation and the answer Pioneer failed
to put in issue in the trial court the question whether the
attorney general was obliged to give Pioneer an opportunity
prior to the petition in intervention to comply with its articles.
On January 26, 1953, at the oral argument of this case,
Pioneer filed a motion to remand the ease to the trial court
''for the purpose of making a further order in the above entitled case to permit the society to continue to operate as
a society and to revoke its former petition to dissolve the
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eorporation and further to restore to the society the funds
of which the Rociety was divested.'' Pioneer alleged in its
motion that on ,January 19, 1953, the members of Pioneer
voted to revoke their petition to dissolve and decided that
they would comply with the provisions of the articles. 3
Pioneer's position is that under section 4606 of the Corporations Code it could terminate dissolution proceedings at any
time before distribution of the assets, that the assets of Pioneer
have not been distributed, 4 and that the trial court does not
have power to transfer the assets of Pioneer to Historical if
dissolution proceedings are terminated. [17] The attorney
general, however, has power to obtain app~intment of a successor trustee under section 10207 of the Corporations Code
(see People v. Cogswell, supra, 113 Cal. 129, 141-142) and
there is nothing therein limiting the power of the attorney
general to cases where the assets of the charitable corporation
have been distributed. It is true that in the present case
Pioneer's abandonment of its trust was brought to light in the
dissolution proceeding, but it does not follow that termination of the dissolution proceeding by Pioneer would establish
that the trust assets should be returned to Pioneer.
Pioneer contends that even if it is held that neither Pioneer
nor its members may receive the assets, the trial court should
have distributed the assets to the heirs of Mrs. Stoltenberg
and not to Historical. We will assume that Pioneer is entitled
to /raise this point. [18] In cases where property is conveyed to a trustee with an express declaration of a charitable
purpose by the donor; a court of equity will appoint a successor trustee to carry out the charitable purpose expressed by
the donor upon failure of the original trustee (Fay v. Howe,
136 Cal. 599, 603 [69 P. 423] ; Estate of Upham, 127 Cal. 90,
94 [59 P. 315]; 14 C.J.S. Charities, § 27), and Historical
contends that these cases govern here. But in cases where,
as here, property is conveyed without restriction to a charitable
"The motion was not made until about 32 months after the interlocutory
judgment, 27 months after the order appealed from, and 6 months after
the District Court of Appeal affirmed the order. During this period
Pioneer's attention was repeatedly called to its status as a charitable
corporation.
'The order of October 18, 1950, provided that Historical "is hereby
appointed trustee of all property . . . for which the Los Angeles County
Pioneer Society is accountable as Trustee" and orders all persons having
assets or records of Pioneer to forthwith turn such assets over to Historical. Execution of the order has been stayed pending outcome of this
appeal. The assets have been impounded and are in the custody of the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles.
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•·orporation and t!H• dwritahk intent of the donor is ;mcertaiued by refrrenw• to tlw dmritab!e purposes of the donee,
the courts have had more difficulty. Some decisions state that
upon dissolutiou of the corporatio11 the property reverts to
the donor or his heirs (see Mormon Clw.rch v. Unded States,
186 U.S. 1, 47 [34 L.Ecl. 478]; Matt v. Danville Seminary,
129 Ill. 403,416 [21 N.E. 927] ), and a dictum in an early case
indicates that that rule would be followed in this jurisdiction,
at least as to real property. (People v. President &; Trustees
of the College of' Calij'orm·a (1869), 38 Cal. 166, 174; cf. Victoria Hospital Assn. v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 464 [147
P. 124] .) [19] Pioneer contends that the Constitution of the
United States compels us to follow here the dictum in the College of California case; it is settled, however, that judicial decisions may be overruled and dicta disapproved without violating either the due process clause or the contract clause of the
United States Constitution. (Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U.S. 444, 450-451 [44 S.Ct. 197, 68 L.Ed. 382]; Alferitz v.
Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 208-209 [58 P. 460).) Accordingly,
we are free to reexamine the dictum in the College of California case.
Decisions holding that g·ifts to charities revert to the donors
upon dissolution have been subjected to severe criticism (see
Simes, 'fhe Law of .B'uture Interests, § 185; Gray, 'l'he Rule
Against Perpetuities [4th ed.}, § 51.1; Turrentine, Suggestions for Revision of PTovisions of' the Califon~ia Civil Code
RegaTcling Future Interests, 21 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 14), and other
states reach a contrary result. (In re Centennial &; Memorial
Assn. of Valley Forge, supra, 235 Pa. 206, 213; McAlhany v.
Jlftrr·ray, 89 S.C. 440, 446 [71 S.E. 1025] ; see, also, Wilson v.
Leary, 120 N.C. 90, 94 [26 S.E. 630, 50 Am.St.Rep. 778, 38
L.R.A. 240] ; Hopkins v. Cr·os9ley, 138 Mich. 561, 566 [101
N.W. 822].) [20] vVe have concluded that the latter rule should
be followed and that a court of equity should appoint a successor trustee to carry out the charitable intent of the donor
whether the charitable purpose is found in the terms of the
conveyance to the corporation or in the articles thereof, or
whether the failure of the corporatig]l i~ through dissolution or other disqualification. [21H The policy of the law
in favor of charitable gifts requires a court to carry out
the dominant purpose of the donor to make a charitable gift
\Jor the purposes expressed in the articles of the original cor40 C.2d-28
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(See Rstate of Tnrrant, 38 Cal.2d 42, 49 [237
P.2il 505, 28 A.Idi.2d 419] ; Estate of Loring, 29 Cal.2d 423,
436 [175 P.2d 5241; Estate of Scrirnger, 188 CaL 158, 166
[206 P. 65] .) [22] If the donors of property to a charitable
corporation wish the property to revert upon dissolution, they
may insert clauses to that effect in their gifts. (See Estate
of Randall, 341 Pa. 501 [19 A.2d 272]; Bogert, Trusts and
'rrustees, § 419.) If the right of reverter is not expressly
reserved, recognition of a right of reverter by the courts
would amount to a mere windfall since by the original
gift the donors indicated that they preferred the property to
be used to carry out the charitable purposes of the donee
rather than go to themselves or to their heirs. A transfer
of the assets to the donors or their heirs would thus conflict
with the policy that the expressed purpose of the donors should
be carried out so far as possible. (See Estate of Lefranc, 38
Cal.2d 289, 296 [239 P.2d 617].) Finally, recognition of
the right of reverter presents grave practical difficulties,
since in many cases dissolution of the charitable corporation
will occur many years after the death of the donors of its
assets and it will be extremely difficult or impossible to determine the heirs entitled to the property. For the foregoing
reasons, the dictum in People v. President &; Trustees of the
College of California, supra, is disapproved. The trial court
therefore properly appointed a trustee in the present case.
[23] Pioneer contends that Historical is not qualified to
act as trustee of the assets. Even if it is assumed that this
question can be raised by Pioneer (see Society of Calif.
Pioneers v. McElroy, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 332, 342), the
selection of Historical as trustee is supported by the record.
Historical is a charitable corporation first organized in 1883
and incorporated in 1891. It has 492 members and is actively
engaged in collecting and preserving material of historic
interest in Southern California. The order appointing Historical trustee provides that it shall hold the transferred assets
as trustee for the same purposes as those expressed in Pioneer's
articles. If Historical does not faithfully perform its duty
as trustee, the attorney general will institute appropriate
proceedings to correct the noncompliance.
[24] Appellant Lelande, although not questioning Historical's fitness to act as trustee, contends that the order appointing Historical trustee should have defined Historical's
duties in more detail. The order of the court followed the
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provisiOns of Pioneer's articles. 5 Lelande points out that
before it was appointed trustee, Historical adopted a resolution providing that the assets acquired from Pioneer would
be used to erect a building to be occupied by Historical and
other societies, 6 and contends that the court should have
ordered Historical to comply with that resolution. In our
opinion, the trial court did not err in limiting its decree to
provisions Rimilar to those in Pioneer's articles. This limitation eonforms to the wishes of the donors of the assets. In
Yiew of our conclusion that Lelande's contentions cannot be
Rttstained, it is unnecessary to discuss the motion of Pioneer
to dismiss Lelande's appeal.
The order is affirmed. The motion by appellant Los Angeles Pioneer Society to remand the case to the trial court,
the motion by appellant Lelande to dismiss the appeal of
apprllant Los Angeles Pioneer Society, and the motion of
apprllant J_,os Angeles Pioneer Society to dismiss the appeal
of appellant Lelande, are, and each is, denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, .J., and Spence, .J.,
concurred.
CARTER, .J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that Pioneer was a charitable organization.
The l.JOS Angeles County Pioneer Society was organized in
1897 as an unincorporated association. In 1910, it was in"'' 1. To cultivate social intercourse and friendship among its members;
'' 2. To collect and preserve data touching the history of Los Angeles
County and the State of California;
'' 3. To collect and preserve articles, specimens and material things
illustrative or demonstrative of the customs, modes, and habits of the
aforesaid times in said State;
'' 4. To perpetuate the memory of those who by their labors and
heroism contributed to make the history of said County and State;
'' 5. And in furtherance of the aforesaid purposes, to receive, purchase,
sell, hold, convey, encumber, lease, rent and maintain all kinds of property, both real and personal;
'' 6. To build clublwuses and do any and all acts, including but not .
limitPd to the borrowing of money, as may be necessary and convenient
for the promotion of the aforesaid purposes,
''And it is further ordered [that the appointment is ineffective until
Historical files an acceptance of the trusteeship providing that Historical]
accepts the trusteeship for the specific purposes set forth above and not
for any purpose which will result in any benefit to any private shareholder, member or individual, and that said assets shall in no way be
devoted to the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation.''
"'l'he resolution provided that the funds would be used to erect a building, known as the Emma Stoltenberg Building, that it would be a home
for the Historical Society, would have offices for Native Sons of the
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eorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the existing laws
of this state. At the time of incorporation, section 593 of
the Civil Code provided that ''A nonprofit corporation may
be formed by any number of persons, not less than three, for
any lawful purposes such as religious, charitable, socrial, e'ducational, 1'CC1'ea,tiona~, cemetery or for rendering services,
which do not contemplate the distribution of gains, profits or
dividends to the members thereof, and for which individuals
lawfully may associate themselves, subject to laws and regulations applicable to particular classes of nonprofit corporations or lines of activity. The carrying on of business at a
profit incidental to the main purposes of the corpora.ti,on and
the d~istribution of assets to members on dissolution shaU not
be deemed forbidden to nonprofit corporations." (Emphasis
>tdded.) Its articles of incorporation provided "That the purpose for which this corpomtiorv is formed is to cultivate soc·ial
interco?Lrse and friendship among its members, to collect and
preserve data touching the early history of Los Angeles
County and the State of California, to collect and preserve
articles, specimens and material things illustrative or demonstrative of the customs, modes and habits of the aforesaid
times in said State; to perpetuate the memory of those who,
by their labors and heroism, contributed to make the history
of said County and State; and in furtherance of said purpose,
to receive, purchase, sell, hold, convey, lease, rent and maintain
all kinds of property, both real and personal; to build clubhouses, and to do any and all other acts necessary and convenient for the promotion of the aforesaid purpose; and to
exist as a social corporation under the proV?:sions of the laws
of the State of Cal?fornia, covering such corporations, and
not for pecuniary profit." (Emphasis added.) It was also
provided that the corporation should exist for a period of 50
years.
Over the years, membership in the organization decreased
until in 1941 there were less than 100 members; at the time of
this action there were approximately 58 members still living.
It would appear to be clear that the Pioneer Society was
organized by a group of people who were brought together by
their common interest in the history and historical relics of
Ijos Angeles County and the state and that their purpose in
flO organizing was to enjoy each other's companionship, to
Golden West and the Native Daughters of the Golden West, and would
have a meeting hall to be used jointly by the three foregoing organizations.

May 1953]

IN RE

L.A.

CoUNTY PIONEER SociETY

869

[40 C.2d 852; 257 P.2d ll

exchange reminiscenees ancl information. In Bogert, TrustR
and Trustees (vol. IIA, § 380, p. 182 et seq.) it is pointed
ont that "riifts to pro,·ide Rot~ia I Pnjoyment for the members
of a private club or other limited gronp have been held not
to be charitable. Probably this is on account of the narrowness of their effect, rather than on account of the nature of the
benefits to be derived. Good conversation, eating and drinking
together, the playing of games, music, and other entertainment no doubt add to the pleasure of life and to some extent
maintain health. A gift for a clubhouse where all citizens of
the community might have such social intercourse has been
held charitable. But donations for the support of private or
limited organizations of a similar type are lacking in the
breadth of influence necessary to give them a public or charitable character." (Emphasis addetl.) In 1947, it was held
in England that a trust to pay income to maintain an institute
in London for people of \Velsh descent where lectures, study,
entertainment, recreation and refreshment could be obtained,
for the purpose of promoting the moral, social, spiritual and
educational welfare of the Welsh people, is not devoted solely
to charitable purposes (Trustees of Sir Howell Jones Williams' Trusts v. Inland Revenue Cornrs., 1 All Eng.R. 513).
'fhe members of the Pioneer Society held meetings, gave
picnics for themselves, held a meeting honoring the memory
of the pioneers who discovered gold in California, erected
a plaque to commemorate the site of the first school building
at Inglewood, California, discussed the pioneers of California
and (according to the majority opinion) ''recollected'' the
activities of those pioneers. According to Webster (Int. Diet.
2d eel.) the word recollect means ''to recover or recall the
knowledge of; to call to mind; to remember.'' Taking into
consideration the average age of 75 years of the members of
Pioneer, it seems logical to assume that they were the children
of these pioneers to whom they paid tribute and that their
purpose in honoring them was not for the benefit of society at
large, but to honor their own ancestors as well as to consolidate their fast dwindling ranks for their own social benefit.
An organization of canary fanciers, rose horticulturists, or
of those interested in purebred cattle, or purebred Irish
Setters, or an association of breeders of Palomino horses could
hardly be called charitable organizations even though an incidental benefit might be said to result to society at large, or
that portion of society also interested in the particular subject. Groups of people vitally interested in the same subject
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mattm· enjoy <>aeh othrr 's eom pany heeause of that interest.
anrl ofte11 form organizatiom; to diseuss, socially, their common intrrests. Any eflneational features of any of these organizations are primarily intended for their own benefit, not for
the benefit of the general public although nonmembers may
improve their knowledge through the efforts of the organization. Such general benefit is purely incidental, however,
to the primary purpose of the organization. I am convinced
that this is the situation we have here. Mrs. Stoltenberg's
first gifts to Pioneer, of which she was a member, were to
enable the organization to purchase a building in which to
hold its meetings which she attended; her last gift, by will,
was to enable her fellow-members and friends to continue their
meetings and social events. It is interesting to note that Historical, the organization appointed to act as trustee, was an
organization existing at the same time as Pioneer during
Mrs. Stoltenberg's lifetime. Had she desired Historical to
have the benefit of her gifts, undoubtedly she knew of its
existence and could have interested herself therein; had she
desired only to benefit the people of this state through the
collection of historical data and relies, undoubtedly she would
have made gifts to both organizations. To my mind, her
membership in Pioneer and her gifts to that organization,
clearly support the social character of Pioneer. Another point
clearly supporting the social character of the organization is
that neither outsiders nor members of the general public
were admitted to the meetings of the society. If an organization is intended to benefit the general public, surely the general public should be admitted to meetings for its benefit.
In AbaLian v. Townsend Social Center, Inc., 112 Cal.App.
2d 441 [246 P.2d 965], it was held that a social center whose
articles of incorporation disclose that its purpose was to
acquire a club building for the convenience of its members and
other persons interested in the old age pension movement was
a nonprofit corporation for the benefit of its members, and not
a charitable corporation holding assets charged with a public
trust. In Estate of Dol, 186 Cal. 64 [198 P. 1039], (a case
holding Pioneer a charitable organization) it was pointed out
that if the "only" object of an organization were to cultivate
social intercourse and friendship among its members, it would
be for the benefit of the members alone and would not be a
charitable organization. I cannot agree that an organization
may not be organized for social purposes with a common
interest in an educational program without being classified
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as a charitable organization. In Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159,
163 [187 P. 428] (involving the French Hospital in Los Angeles), it was held that "One of the essential features of a
charitable use is that it shall be for the public benefit, either
for the entire public or for some particular class of persons,
indefinite in number, who constitute a part of the public.
The persons to be benefited must consist of 'the general public
or some class of the general public indefinite as to names and
numbers.' (Estate of Coleman, 167 Cal. [212], 214 [Ann. Cas.
1915C, 682, 138 Pac. 992, 993] ; Estate of Lennon, 152 Cal. 327
[125 Am.St.Rep. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024, 92 Pac. 870] .) " Here
the members of Pioneer were definite and known. Here, as
in Estate of Dol, supra, 182 Cal. 159, no one was entitled to the
benefits of the society except those who became admitted as
members and paid their dues. It was there held, in line with
Stewart v. California Medical Etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 419
[176 P. 46], that "the declaration in the articles alone are
insufficient to establish the character of the St. Helena Hospital as a public charity, and the evidence of the manner in
which it was conducted shows that it was not" and "the
character of the institution is to be determined, not alone
by the powers of the corporation as defined in its charter but
also by the manner of conducting the hospital.'' That statement is pertinent here. I have heretofore shown that this
organization was conducted for the benefit of the members
alone ; that its meetings were not open to the public; that its
primary purpose was the social benefit to be derived by the
members from their association with each other. In Estate of
Henderson, 17 Cal.2d 853, 857 [112 P.2d 605], this court said
"A bequest is charitable if: ( 1) It is made for a charitable
purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religious, educational, political or general social interest to mankind.
(People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 2691 ;
Estate of Merchant, 143 Cal. 537 [77 P. 475] .) (2) The ultimate rreipients constitute either the community as a whole or
an unascertainable and indefinite portion thereof. (People v.
Cogswell, supra; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457; Fay v.
Howe, 136 Cal. 599 [69 P. 423] .) The charitable nature of
an institution is determined on the same basis." (See In re
La Societe Francm"se Etc. Mutuelle, 75 Cal.App.2d 770 [171
P.2d 544].)
In summary, and in applying the tests laid down in Estate
of Henderson, supra, 17 Oal.2d 853, (1) Pioneer's aims were
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to promote the social life of its members through their common interest in California history; (2) The ultimate recipients
of any benefits to be derived from the organization were the
members in good standing of the organization, not the community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion
thereof.
In a nonprofit corporation existing for the private benefit
of its members, upon dissolution assets are distributed among
the members (Corp. Code, § 9801; Brown v. La Societe Francaise Etc. Mutnelle, 138 Cal. 475, 477 [71 P. 516] ; Abalian v.
Townsend Social Cente1-, Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441, 449 [246
P.2d 965]; 168 A.L.R. 956). This, I believe, is the result
which should be reached here. It seems quite apparent that
Pioneer was a nonprofit organization existing for the private
benefit of its members who should, upon dissolution, receive a
distributive share of the assets held by Pioneer.
Assuming, however, only for the purposes of the following
argument that Pioneer is a charitable organization, I see no
valid reason why it should not be able to correct its deviation
from its articles of incorporation. In other words, why should
not Pioneer be permitted to continue to operate as a society
and to revoke its former petition to dissolve the corporation?
It is admitted in the majority opinion, that Pioneer's "abandonment of its trust was brought to light in the dissolution
proceeding.'' Section 4691 of the Corporations Code provides that ''if the cause of action is a matter or act which
the corporation has done or omitted to do that can be corrected
by amendment of its articles or by other corporate action, such
suit shall not be maintained 1tnless (a) the Attorney General, at least 30 days prior to the institution of suit, has given
the corporation wr'itten notice of the matter or act done or
omitted to be done, and (b) the corporation has failed, negT'ected, or re[1tsed to institnte proceedings to correct 1:t within
the 30-day period or thereafter fails to prosecute such proceedings." (Emphasis added.) The majority calls attention
to the fact that during the time intervening after the interlocutory judgment, the order appealed from and the affirmance by the District Court of Appeal, Pioneer's attention was
repeatedly ealled to its status as a charitable organization.
No mention is made of the fact that there was still to be made
a determination by this court. In the event that this court
had not decided that Pioneer was a charitable organization,
it would have had the right to dissolve and distribute its assets
among its members. Vlhy then, should it not be given notice
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after tl1e final determination has been made, t.hat it must
eonform to its articles or that a suceessor trusteE' will be appointed~
It is intf'resting to notf' that the title of section
4691 is ''Conditions precedent: Notice affording opportunity
for corrective action." The majority states that under section
10207 of the Corporations Code, the attorney general has
power to obtain the appointment of a successor trustee and
that "there is nothing therein limiting the power of the .Attorney General to cases where the assets of the charitable
eorporation have been distributed.'' 'l'he assets, involved here
have not been distributed but have been impounded pending
the final determination of the issues involved. Section 10207
provides that ''Each such [charitable] corporation shall be
subject at all times to examination by the .Attorney General,
on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs
and to what extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts
which it has assumed or may depart from the general purpose
for which it is formed. In case of any such failure or departure the .Attorney General shall institute, in the name of
the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure. Except as specially approved by the
.Attorney General such a corporation shall not accumulate
income for a period longer than five years." (Emphasis
added.) The section provides for "correction" of a noneompliance or departure; it does not prohibit a self-correction
by the erring corporation. If Pioneer terminates its dissolution proceedings, and continues as it has done in the past,
then, under the view taken by the majority of this court, it
will be carrying on its charitable purposes and there is no reason why a successor trustee should be appointed to administer
Pioneer's funds. No authority is cited for the proposition that
Pioneer may not be permitted to correct its deviation from
its articles by withdrawing or revoking its dissolution proceedings nor have I found any such authority. The Restatement of Trusts ( § 392) provides that (comment a) "A suit
in equity can be maintained by the Attorney General to compel the trustees of a charitable trust to perform their duties
as trustees, or to enjoin them from committing a breach of
trust, or to compel them to redress a breach of trust, or to
appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property;
or to remove the trustees and appoint other trustees.'' There
are, thus, several remedies other than the appointment of a
successor trustee.
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There was no bad faith on the part of Pioneer in voting to
dissolve the corporation. It filed an action in declaratory
relief and obtained a judgment to the effect that no trust of
any kind was impressed upon its assets; it voted to dissolve
and then petitioned the superior court for judicial supervision of the dissolution; it agreed that the attorney general
might file a petition in intervention. Under the circumstances
presented and in view of the fact that the applicable statutes
do not prevent it, there appears to be no sound reason why
Pioneer should not be permitted to revoke its dissolution proceedings and carry out the trust imposed by its articles since
it is finally adjudged to be a charitable organization.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 28,
1953. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petitions should be granted.
The following opinions were then filed.
CARTER, J.-I dissent from the order denying· appellant's
petition for rehearing, and in view of the contention of appellant in said petition that the effect of the decision of this
court is to deprive it of its property without due process of
law, I am constrained to comment on this contention.
The record in this case presents one of the most outrageous
examples of legalized larceny which has come under my
observation.
The Pioneer Society was organized as an unincorporated
association; the evidence shows clearly, and without contradiction, that it was intended to be, and was, a purely social
organization. As such an unincorporated association and
social organization, it had the right, upon dissolution, to
distribute its assets among its members.
The record discloses that Pioneer has acted with the utmost
good faith throughout. In the first instance, Pioneer sought
a judicial determination of its charitable, or social, status.
'l'he first judicial determination was that it was a nonprofit,
noncharitable organization. A later judicial determination
by the same court held it to be a charitable organization.
Pioneer then sought to abandon its dissolution proceedings
and, in accordance with the last judicial determination, carry
on as a charitable organization. This it has not been permitted
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to do. A majority of this court has declared that Pioneer
is a charitable organization and that it may not be permitted
to correct its so-called deviation from its articles of incorporation ; that its assets must be turned over to a successor trusteethe Historical Society. As I pointed out in my dissenting
opinion, this is a clear violation of the statutory provisions
involved, which permit corrective action by a charitable organization which has deviated from its articles. Even if Pioneer
is a charitable organization (which I am firmly convinced it
is not) it has the right to abandon its dissolution proceedings
and correct any deviation from its articles of incorporation.
To refuse to permit such corrective action is, in my opinion,
to deprive Pioneer of its property without due process of law
under both the federal and state Constitutions.
With respect to corporations, this court is empowered only
to apply the statutory law of the state as it was written by
the Legislature; it is not empowered to ignore the statutory
provisions relating to corporations and effect a distribution
of corporate assets as its collective whim may dictate.
For the reasons stated herein, and in my dissenting opinion,
r w·ould grant a rehearing and reverse the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the reasoning and
conclusion of Justice Carter. Particularly do I find no justification whatsoever for refusing to permit Pioneer to take
the corrective action which it could not know it should take
until this court had ruled that it could not rely on the prior
final judgment or its charter from the state.
Pioneer, by its articles of incorporation and the laws of
California was not a charitable corporation; it never intended
or pretended to be a charitable corporation; it paid taxes as
a noncharitable corporation; it was adjudicated not to be a
charitable corporation. With that background it instituted
a proceeding for disf;olntion as it had a right to do. Its every
act showK the good faith of the fine citizens composing it.
Now this court rules that it is a charitable corporation and
in the same judgment punishes Pioneer for instituting the
lawful dissolution proceeding by stripping it of its assets and
giving them to another; it refuses even to permit Pioneer,
despite the authorization of the statute, to discontinue the
dissolution proceeding and to carry out the trust which the
court adjudges to exist.
Such action in my view is contrary to fact, to law, to justice,
to reason and to constitutional guarantees,

